Map: Central Routes May 2008

As soon as fighting broke out supporters of both sides began barricading roads and in some cases deploying armed militiamen to guard the roadblocks. Red cut roads throughout the country in order to cut off the three important Blue areas from each other: the southern suburbs of Beirut, the northern Bekaa, and the south. They also blocked the border crossings to Syria. Blue blocked the roads in and around Beirut, especially those leading to the airport.

Neither side could expect foreign troops to intervene on their behalf but these links to the outside world were still important. The US has been supplying the LAF and especially the Red-dominated Internal Security Forces for years in the hope that they would turn against Hezbollah. During the siege of Nahr el-Barid the US rushed additional supplies to Lebanon by air. Meanwhile Hezbollah has been rapidly building up its own arsenal with weapons sent from Iran through Syria.

Symbols

Blue Route

These are routes that are of vital importance to Blue in a war, especially one with Israel. They connect the three predominantly Shi’a areas of the country with each other and with Syria. Defending them would be critical in a full-scale invasion by Israel.

Chouf Route

These routes would be convenient for Blue to use in a war against Israel if it could but they are not necessary. They are much more important to the PSP’s defense of their enclave in the Chouf.

Jabal Barouk road

The Jabal Barouk mountains rise from the Chouf to the west and then fall off sharply into the Bekaa Valley to the east. Israel built roads along and across the range during their occupation of the area in the 1980s. These roads are of much less value to Hezbollah in a war against Israel than the better roads along the valley floor but they could be of some use. On the other hand Israel would doubtless advance along them if it launched another full-scale invasion of Lebanon like in 1982. They also allow access to Joumblatt’s fief in the Chouf from the Blue-dominated area around Lake Karoun.

Red roadblock

People aligned with Red in one way or another made serious attempts to block the roads in these places. Usually this began with civilians making barricades. Sometimes militiamen also set up checkpoints, especially in the Chouf and the Bekaa. Blue roadblocks are not shown on this map because they were concentrated in around Beirut.

Limitations

Ideally this map should have been made by someone who has driven all over Lebanon during both peace and war and has long military experience but if you don’t speak Arabic this is probably the best you’re ever going to get. Information on roadblocks was easy to get. This is exactly what people wanted to know about during the fighting. The routes marked here were on the NIMA VMAP, which I believe is probably missing some highways built in the last few years as well as all of the less important roads, and also were important in the Israeli invasion of 1982.

Summary

Red partisans attempted to disrupt Blue communications by road at numerous points across the central part of Lebanon.

“Themes”

• Notice how important the Chtaura-Zahle-Masnaa area is. It lies halfway between Beirut and Damascus and the only practical routes to Baalbek and the Blue stronghold in the Bekaa pass through here.
• The PSP’s domination of the Chouf gives it an important advantage of interior lines. From here they could threaten the coast road, the Beirut-Damascus road, and even the roads leading into the Bekaa without going farther than 25km from the center of their homeland.
• There are many small, unreleated pieces of land scattered across Lebanon that Blue had good reason to covet.

Map: Choueifat-Aley May 2008

This map covers the hills south and southeast of Beirut. They are among the most fought-over places in the country. The most intense fighting here in the 1975-1990 wars was in the early 1980s when Walid Joumblatt’s PSP, then backed by Syria, repeatedly tried to drive the Lebanese Armed Forces off of the hills. For much of this time he was opposed by Gen. Michel Aoun’s 8^th Brigade, then backed by the US. The fighting spread when the PSP repeatedly shelled the US Marines at the airport, killing four. Eventually US Navy ships shelled PSP militiamen attacking the hill to keep them from capturing it.

The hills are important primarily because they allow observers to look down into Beirut. A few men with binoculars and communications with artillery hidden in the mountains can reduce anything in the city to rubble given enough time. The southern suburbs especially are in easy reach, including the Presidential Palace at Baabda, the LAF headquarters nearby, and the homes of several hundred thousand mostly-Shi’a Lebanese. In addition Hill 888 and its neighbors dominate important routes leading out of the city. The road leading south along the coast from Khaldeh runs just under the hills. The main Beirut-Damascus highway passes through Aley.

Areas shaded blue were captured by the militias of the Blue coalition after defeating the PSP in combat. Later these areas were turned over to the LAF. Areas shaded purple were apparently surrendered to the LAF by the PSP without being captured by Blue. Often the LAF allowed Blue agents to search the offices of Red parties in these areas.

The first set of arrows are for the limited round of fighting in the Chouf during the battles in Beirut. The “May 11” arrows show the attacks by Blue on the afternoon of that day. At this point the PSP allegedly began firing antiaircraft guns from Baysur. Blue then fired a barrage of mortar shells across the front and PSP resistance quickly gave way. The “May 11-12” arrows show the course of the fighting from this time on until the shooting stopped sometime overnight.

NOTE: This map is not accurate or precise.

It is based on several different sources, most importantly summaries of news stories being broadcast on Lebanese television at the time. A great deal of information is lacking, especially on what the situation was before fighting started. what direction attacks were made from, and what militias were participating.

I am more confident about the areas captured. Al-Manar reported a highly plausible list of places captured by Blue by the end of the war. Newspapers also provided some confirmation.

Very little information was available on the fighting along the Abadiyeh-Aley axis, the army’s activities along the Beirut-Damascus highway, or the status of Aley at the end of the fighting.

The actual fighting was much more confused. The two sides were tangled together in ways that would be difficult to show on a map even if I had more information. Blue militiamen were in the Shi’a villages of Komatiye and Keyfoun from the beginning. Some isolated Red militiamen may have remained scattered in the area that I have shaded as captured.

I would welcome any information at all that may be relevant, no matter how unimportant it might seem. Even confirmation of what I already know from another source can help.

summary

Blue initially attacked from coast south of Khaldeh. When more serious fighting broke out on the afternoon of May 11 they turned north, isolating Chouiefat from Aitat and Hill 888. After breaking up Red resistance with mortar barrages they finally they drove east across the hills and into Baysur and Aley.

“themes”

Keyfoun and Komatiye held out until help arrived despite being mostly surrounded by Red-dominated villages.

Despite clearly having the upper hand in the fighting Blue did not capture the summits of the the hills before the mortar barrage. Afterward it captured the hills but did not push on beyond them.

Apart from the fighting in Beirut itself this was the decisive “battle” of the war, deciding the fate of millions of people. It took place over one 10-km long ridge.

Sides

I have arbitrarily named the two opposing coalitions "Red" and "Blue" for lack of any better term. None of the names usually used for these coalitions are adequate. Most of them are propaganda in themselves, attempting to define the conflict as sectarian or national. Each side is made up of a wide variety of different factions which have their own reasons for joining the alliance. Most factions have fought against the nation they supposedly back now, and for the nation that they supposedly are against. Calling one side the “majority” and the other the “opposition” might comfort ethnocentric Europeans (or more likely ethnocentric Lebanese who think they are Europeans) but Lebanon is not run by a European-style government and neither is my country. More objective names are also available, like “March 8” and “March 14” but since I am not a robot I refuse to use 8 and 14 as names.

The two sides are:

Red

also known as

“March 14”

“anti-Syrian”

“majority”

“pro-US”

includes

Future Movement (Hariri)

PSP (Joumblatt)

Lebanese Forces (Geagea)

Blue

also known as

“March 8”

“pro-Syrian”

“opposition”

includes

Hezbollah (Nasrallah)

Amal (Berri)

FPM (Aoun)